Violence in the Workplace—Preventing Armed Robbery: A Practical Handbook

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Foreword

This handbook focuses on violence committed during the course of robberies and hold-ups in commercial premises. The approach taken is preventive rather than reactive.

The handbook is written with robbery and armed hold-up prevention in large and medium-sized retail organisations in mind, although the strategies can be applied to a range of sites and situations; for example, convenience stores or hold-ups in chemist shops for drugs. The focus is prevention of homicide and injury—not averting cash loss—although it is recognised that there is a close overlap.

A range of strategies and protective devices can be adopted that reduce both the incentives for robbery and the risks of homicide and severe injury during an armed hold-up. Many of these strategies are detailed in this preventive handbook. Reducing the risks of armed hold-up not only ensures employees are protected, but also minimises robbery losses and associated breakages. Employers with few hold-ups may also have lower insurance premiums, and their employees who feel safe at work are likely to have improved productivity.

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Acknowledgments

Contents

Abbreviations

ATM	Automatic Teller Machine
AFP	Australian Federal Police
ASD	Administrative Services Department
CAL/OSHA	California Occupational Safety and Health Administration
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
DETIR	Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations
DHAC	Department of Health and Aged Care
DWH&S	Division of Workplace Health and Safety
HSE	Health and Safety Executive
MSFU	Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union
NACS	National Association of Convenience Stores
NIOSH	National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NOHSC	National Occupational Health and Safety Commission
OHS	Occupational Health and Safety
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
QIRC	Queensland Industrial Relations Commission
TAB	Totalisator Agency Board
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UNISON	A large public sector union in the United Kingdom
USOPM	United States Office of Personnel Management
WCBBC	Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia
WHC	Workers' Health Centre
WWA	WorkSafe Western Australia

"…police on patrol, should be able to see into the store. Employees in the store should have an unobstructed view of the street, clear of shrubbery, trees or any form of clutter that a criminal could use to hide. Signs located in windows should be either low or high to allow good visibility into the store.

The customer service and cash register areas should be visible from outside the establishment. Shelves should be low enough to assure good visibility throughout the store. Convex mirrors, two-way mirrors, and an elevated vantage point can give employees a more complete view of their surroundings.

…The parking area and the approach to the retail establishment should be well lit during nighttime hours of operation. Exterior illumination may need upgrading in order to allow employees to see what is occurring outside the store."(OSHA 1998, p. 6).

Executive Summary

Occupational violence is a problem with significant legal, economic and emotional consequences for employers and individuals. The Australian Institute of Criminology is producing a series of three handbooks with practical advice on the prevention of occupational violence. These handbooks are designed for medium to large-sized organisations.

This handbook is aimed at the prevention of violence during armed hold-ups and robberies. Offenders who are unknown to workers on-site typically commit such incidents. The armed hold-up or robbery may involve (a) a "one-off" physical act of violence that results in a fatal or a non-fatal injury with loss of goods or money, and/or (b) involve some form of threat to ensure compliance and achieve financial gain which does not result in a physical injury. Another handbook produced by the Institute focuses on violence that arises *within* an organisation; for example, between a supervisor and an employee, or between one employee and another. A third handbook addresses prevention of *client-initiated* violence (such as between health care staff and patients).

This handbook includes discussions in a number of areas.

- The importance of careful work site design, including fittings and the nearby environment. This prevention approach is known as "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design".

- Minimisation of risk through "target hardening", "increasing visibility" and "reducing rewards" strategies.

- Well-designed cash control strategies.

- The need for written armed hold-up and robbery prevention policy and strategy documents.

- Ways to reduce the impact on individuals following an incident.

- An outline of risk identification, risk assessment, and risk control procedures applied to armed hold-up prevention.

- Legal responsibilities of employers to provide a safe worksite and process of conducting work.

- A series of detailed draft prevention policy and strategy documents and checklists which employers can adopt and adapt to specific on-site conditions.

Background and Introduction

Violence associated with robberies and armed hold-ups is an issue of concern to a range of people, including owners of retail establishments, banks, convenience store employees, workers' organisations, and insurance companies, as well as those within the criminal justice system. Following an armed hold-up or robbery that involves violence (or the threat of violence), there are significant legal, economic and emotional consequences for employers and individuals. The Australian Institute of Criminology is committed to the production of prevention advice to reduce the number and the impact of such incidents.

This handbook focuses specifically on the prevention of violence associated with armed hold-ups and robberies in buildings (and not mobile worksites such as taxis) that arise from customers or unknown members of the public. The prevention of robbery and protection of business assets is not the prime focus, except for identification of strategies that lead to a reduced risk of violence. Following an overview of prevention strategies, a series of possible policy, strategy and checklist documents are provided as appendices. It is hoped that organisations will find these documents useful in assisting the development of their own armed hold-up and robbery prevention strategies and documents. However, banks and other large commercial sites will undoubtedly already have their own confidential detailed measures. Other handbooks have been produced by the Australian Institute of Criminology to assist with the prevention of violence from other employees within organisations (Mayhew 2000a) and *client-initiated* violence (Mayhew 2000b), as well as an *overview* report (Perrone 1999). Violence in the transport industry has been dealt with in the handbook on client-initiated violence, as many incidents are unrelated to theft.

Characteristics of Armed Hold-Ups and Robberies

An armed hold-up or robbery may involve (a) a "one-off" physical act of violence that results in a fatal or a non-fatal injury with loss of goods or

money; or (b) some form of threat to ensure compliance and achieve financial gain. In this latter case, victims may have substantial emotional consequences without any physical injury. Some assailants masquerade as customers to "check out" premises, while others spend little time in planning and initiate hold-ups when opportunities present.

The situations within which armed hold-ups and robberies with violence occur will vary. For workers in establishments holding large amounts of money, night and shiftworkers, those who work alone, those employed in high-crime areas, or those in establishments selling medications, the risks may be exacerbated.

Some basic prevention strategies will be required in all retail outlets (such as cash access restrictions), but because the risk factors vary, control strategies will have to be specifically adjusted to industry sub-sectors and worksites. For example, convenience stores may have an increased need for careful store layout design, and fast-food outlets may focus attention on security in drive-through service areas. Due to these highly variable situations and risk factors, armed hold-up and robbery prevention strategies have to be customised. This handbook covers basic common elements.

Patterns and Incidence of Violence Associated with Armed Hold-Ups and Robberies

The industry sub-groups at high risk of armed hold-up or robbery-related violence are similar across the industrialised world, and have remained relatively constant over time (although the incidence may have increased).

Groups at risk of robbery-related violence in the United Kingdom and Canada include bank workers, retail sales staff, staff in takeaway food outlets, bar and off-licence staff, milkmen, and transport and taxi drivers (Trades Union Congress (TUC) 1999, pp. 6, 8–9, 18; Standing and Nicolini 1997, pp. 7–9; Hancock 1995, p. 19). (Prevention of violence to transport and taxi workers has been discussed in the Australian Institute of Criminology client-initiated violence handbook.) In the United Kingdom, bank robberies where firearms were used increased by 59 per cent over 1990–1991 (Reynolds 1994, pp. 18–19). Similar significant increases in the use of weapons during violent robberies have been reported in Scandinavia (Wynne et al. 1996, pp. 13–14, 21).

In the United States, bartenders, liquor store, service station, hotels or motels, grocery shops, eating and drinking establishments, and jewellery and convenience store workers were at high risk of robbery-related violence (OSHA 1998, p. 1; Department of Justice 1998, p. 2; Wilkinson 1998, pp. 3–9; National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 1997, pp. 2–3; Myers 1996, p. 5; CAL/OSHA (California Occupational Safety and Health Administration) 1995, p. 4). However, once socio-economic and demographic male variables were controlled, variations across the United States industries were lower (Kposowa 1999, p. 74). Robberies and other criminal activity account for almost 80 per cent of all United States work-related homicides and at least 30 per cent of non-fatal assaults, with over three-quarters of homicides committed with firearms (NIOSH 1996, p. 5). The increased level of homicide during robberies in the United States compared with other industrialised countries is undoubtedly related to weaker gun control laws and increased levels of gun ownership.

Overall, retail trade workers experienced 48 per cent of all United States occupational homicides in 1996 (OSHA 1998, p. 1; Reiss and Roth 1993, p. 151; Thomas 1992, p. 60). Much of the violence occurred when robbers entered a worksite for criminal purposes and attacked employees or proprietors (Baron and Neuman 1996, p. 162). Self-employed owner-managers were over-represented; for example, in California 34.8 per cent of 147 assault-related fatality victims were self-employed (Nelson and Kaufman 1996, pp. 438, 440; CAL/OSHA 1995, p. 4; Thomas 1992, p. 57). As Thomas (1992, p. 57) identifies, difficulties accessing baseline employment data makes calculation of incidence ratios for the self-employed very difficult. Similarly, Fisher and Looye (2000, p. 45) found in their study of 400 small United States businesses that one in eight had been subject to burglary and vandalism, with repeat and multiple victimisation common. While they found that convenience store, service station, bank and commercial institution robberies had declined over 1991 to 1995 (Fisher and Looye 2000, p. 48), they did not elaborate on levels of violence associated with robberies.

While criminology has in the past remained relatively distinct from Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) research and practice, this separation is likely to blur with increasing levels of occupational violence. For example, the California Division of OHS examined inspectorate data over a four-year period: one-third of all violence-related inspections followed fatal incidents and 27.4 per cent a physical assault—and citations for security hazards were issued to 23.6 per cent of these businesses (Peek-Asa and Howard 1999,

p. 647). That is, closer liaison between police and the OHS authorities can be expected. Inevitably, OHS professionals and practitioners will need to develop a better understanding of security issues.

Victimisation is not random. Repeat and multiple victimisation is common in some areas and little crime at all is reported in others. There are "hot spots" where businesses and their workforce are at greatly increased risk (Fisher and Looye 2000, pp. 50, 61). The general pattern appears to be an increase in violent incidents over the past decade, although under-counting is significant. The Fisher and Looye (2000, p. 58) study of 400 small United States businesses found that 9 per cent of burglaries, 33 per cent of vandalism acts, and all employee thefts went unreported to police. Similarly, violence is likely to be under-counted; for example, a customer murdered in a retail shop would not be counted, nor would an off-duty employee on-site to pick up a pay-check (Nalla et al. 1996, pp. 8, 89; Myers 1996, p. 3; Wynne et al. 1996, pp. 9–10; Cox and Leather 1994, p. 214). The desire to prevent similar future events and the claiming of insurance were the most common reasons for formally reporting incidents, with minor robberies that did not result in injuries or loss of goods more likely to go unreported (Fisher and Looye 2000, p. 58; Cook et al. 1999, p. 5; Thomas 1992, p. 58).

Workplace violence is not random in Australia. In contrast to the United States pattern, only 2.8 per cent of all traumatic work fatalities in Australia were due to homicide (the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) 1999b, p. vii). Of these, around 26 per cent were associated with robberies, and 26 per cent with assaults (NOHSC 1999b, p. 9). As in the United States, access to weapons was an important influence on the severity of the assault—49 per cent of workplace homicide victims were shot, 22 per cent stabbed with a knife, and 18 per cent assaulted with another weapon (NOHSC 1999b, p. 9). On some occasions, an offender's aggression may be a deliberate self-protective "flight or fight" response.

A female shoplifter in a retail store was apprehended by a security guard:

- *she was taken by security to the manager's office;*
- *the security guard then left to deal with another shoplifter; and*
- *the shoplifter attacked the manager.*

Outcome: The manager sustained a severe concussion (Hancock 1995, p. 16).

There are gender variations in patterns of violence. While the international evidence is patchy, it appears females experience higher levels of verbal abuse than males, and males experience more threats and physical assaults than females (Mayhew and Quinlan 1999; Chappell and Di Martino 1998, p. 44; Wynne et al. 1996, p. 10). However, the pattern varies greatly between countries. This gender variation in risk can be partially explained by the sexual division of labour with women concentrated in low paid and lower status jobs with greater face-to-face contact with members of the public—such as retail sales. For example, in the United States homicides are now the leading cause of death for women workers because females are frequently employed in convenience stores which are at higher risk (OSHA 1998, p. 1; Reiss and Roth 1993, p. 151; Thomas 1992, p. 60). In contrast, in Australia males more frequently died, with assailants also generally male (75 per cent of known offenders) (NOHSC 1999b, pp. vii, 9). Yet, the pattern can be quite different for violence-related *injuries*. For example, in the state of Western Australia, female employees in service stations, chemist shops and video outlets were at higher risk, as were female pizza delivery and taxi drivers (WorkSafe Western Australia (WWA) 1999b, p. 2). Alternative explanations for gender variations in incidence are that female staff are "attractive" targets because robbers believe they are unlikely to fight back (Indermaur 1995, p. 186). Thus risks may be increased for older females who may be perceived to be "easy targets" for hold-ups (Wilkinson 1998, p. 11; NIOSH 1997, p. 2; Nelson and Kaufman 1996; Nalla et al. 1996, p. 90; Wynne et al. 1996, p. 10). Conversely, male victims of robberies may be more likely to directly confront offenders (even when outnumbered) and this resistance can precipitate violence. Other evidence from the United Kingdom suggests levels of aggression may be restrained for more attractive females (Cox and Leather 1994, p. 226).

There are other forms of robbery-related violence that remain, as yet, largely unexplored but which may be increasingly common. For example, in the maritime industry (predominantly staffed by an international labour force), robbery-related violence at sea and piracy is growing:

> "…*violent attacks on ships and their crews are occurring with increasing frequency and intensity. In 1997 some 229 vessels were attacked…631 crew members suffered violence in these attacks, with 51 crew members reported killed*" (House of Representatives Standing Committee 1998, p. 49).

Businesses at Risk of Armed Hold-Up and Robbery-Related Violence

Further examination of patterns is necessary to identify risk factors in order to design appropriate prevention strategies. For example, the potential for robbery-related violence may increase at particular times of the day or night, on specific days of the week, at venues where there is excessive alcohol intake, or in particular geographical areas. Any site where large money transactions occur is at higher-risk of instrumental violence. The more money potentially available, the greater the risk; hence the greater the attention that should be paid to robbery prevention. Entertainment facilities (particularly those where alcohol is served) are also at high risk for both instrumental and non-instrumental violence; for example, hotels, nightclubs, and cinema complexes with pubs nearby. Some high-risk examples are provided below, although this is not intended to be an exhaustive list.

Hold-Ups and Robbery-Related Violence in Organisations Holding Large Amounts of Money

Any site where money transactions occur is at high risk, and those who are carrying larger amounts of cash are at increased peril. Particularly high-risk sites include banks, post offices, building societies, courts where fines are paid, estate agents collecting rent, casino and other gambling outlets such as Totalisator Agency Boards (TABs), armoured vehicles that transport cash, and individuals carrying cash to a secure place. Even with all appropriate security measures, those carrying large amounts of cash are at increased risk.

An Australian bookmaker was very aware of safety precautions as he often carried large sums of money. He carried an emergency panic button in his pocket to summon police if necessary, he had an automatic button for his garage and the garage light, and he would not get out of the car until the garage door closed behind. He also regularly checked the street near his home for suspicious vehicles:

- *he was attacked and stabbed by assailants in the garage of his home when he returned from the dog track; and*

- *it is not known exactly what he was doing in the garage at the time of the incident.*

Outcome: The bookmaker died. Approximately $20,000 was stolen (unpublished data from Driscoll et al. 1999).

Security guards transporting money in armoured vehicles work in a section of the cash-in-transit industry that is well-known, conspicuous and well-regulated. Employees are also clearly covered by workers' compensation insurance in the event of a work-related injury. However, regulation of what is known as the "soft-skin" section of the industry is less clear. In essence, workers dress inconspicuously, blend in with the public and drive passenger vehicles that have no distinguishing features (Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) 1996, pp. 8–9). In other words, cash transit is covert. Many may be owner-managers of small courier businesses who have limited insurance protection if injured—although cash losses may be covered. Casualisation is rife in this sector, and the under-cutting of businesses with more substantial protection is common (QIRC 1996, pp. 24, 27). There may be little overlap between the two sectors in terms of robbery prevention strategies, carrying of weapons, or in requirements for licensing of personnel—with the soft-skin sub-sector arguably less well trained. For all workers, it is a dangerous industry. In the armoured sector, security guards are at greatest risk when leaving their vehicle and entering or leaving premises carrying cash. In contrast, soft-skin operators are most at risk when their identity is discovered. The risks of the job are not just physical—one major security firm admitted to a formal enquiry that 9 per cent of their road crew were on stress leave (QIRC 1996, pp. 21, 44).

Australian security firm employees were picking up the weekend's takings from a city car park. This was a routine pick up. The roof was too low in the car park to allow the security van to enter, so the driver and the van remained outside on the road whilst two security guards collected the money:

- *as the guards walked back towards the security vehicle with the money, two men jumped from the back of a parked van;*

- *one security guard was shot and died of a single gunshot wound to the chest;*

- *the other security guard was threatened; and*

- *the assailants took the money and jumped into the back of their van, which sped to the end of the car park.*

Outcome: Three men were seen running away from the scene; they were never identified. There was no mention in the coronial report of whether or not the fatally wounded guard wore a bullet-proof vest (NOHSC 2000, p. 4).

Other high-risk sites for hold-ups are those that hold highly sought after goods. For example, drugs stored in chemist shops are a strong attraction for those with addictions.

> *…chemist shops and drug dealers represent the ultimate desperate robbery, for the ultimate object of the crime (drugs) can be taken directly…offender described an armed robbery on a chemist shop where the offenders were "shooting up" the stolen drugs as they drove away from the chemist shop. Many other stories reinforced the point that the object of the robbery was to turn the proceeds into drugs as quickly as possible. The central dimension for the offender appears to be the delay from the experience of an acute need for drugs to the point where drugs are consumed* (Indermaur 1995, p. 184).

There is significant debate about the extent to which crime is opportunistic. Some argue that offenders who perceive difficulties with a primary target displace their activity elsewhere (Indermaur 1995, p. 201; Kennedy 1993, p. 113). In other words crime is displaced rather than prevented. Thus, eliminating the opportunities for crime on one site (such as through improved security) does not reduce overall crime levels as criminals move to other targets (perhaps competitors in the marketplace) (Ferreira 1995, p. 155). It may be that displacement occurs more frequently for particular crimes (for example, convenience store robberies), and less frequently for others (such as white-collar crimes). The Clarke and Field (1991, p. 88) and Clarke (1990, p. 23) evaluations of the impact of "target hardening" found little evidence that improved bank security had resulted in increases in robberies in other targets such as pharmacies, convenience stores or service stations. Similarly the Hesseling (1994, p. 197) review of 55 studies of crime prevention argued that: "…displacement is not inevitable, and that if displacement occurs, it will be limited in scope". However other studies show there is displacement: Grandjean (cited in Clarke and Field 1991, p. 88) reported a shift of robberies from Swiss banks that had tightened security to less protected banks. That is, the displacement hypothesis is complex, dependent on the situation, and may be subject to spurious correlations (see Hesseling 1994, p. 217). The general consensus is that displacement is less than 100 per cent, and a diffusion of benefits may occur (Clarke 1995).

Armed Hold-Ups and Robberies in Retail, Convenience and Other Small Businesses

Cash-on-hand provides an inducement to robbery in retail trade, drive-through hotel supplies or off-licences, video stores, service stations,

newsagencies, hairdressing salons, taxi and pizza delivery drivers, and late night shops and convenience stores (Chappell and Di Martino 1999, p. 8; WWA 1999a, p. 2; WorkCover New South Wales 1994; Cardy 1992, p. 35). Fast-food outlets with drive-through facilities may be emerging as popular robbery targets because they offer easy car access, ready cash, few other customers who can be potential witnesses, and a casual and inexperienced young workforce who are unlikely to resist. There are four core risk factors associated with robbery-related violence in these small retail establishments:

- the business exchanges money with customers;

- there are few workers on-site;

- the business trades in the evening or at night; and

- workers have face-to-face communications with customers (Heskett 1996, p. 16).

Other risk factors include:

- working in a high crime area;

- valuable items carried by other customers such as jewellery;

- guarding money or valuable possessions of customers, for example in cloakrooms;

- the availability and carrying of weapons by customers;

- gang member customers;

- customers who are drug users;

- intoxication of customers—which can compound the risks of aggressive behaviour; and

- "fighting back" at robbery attempts, or endeavouring to protect employer's property or money (CAL/OSHA 1998, pp. 2–3 and 1995, p. 8; OSHA 1998, pp. 4–5; WorkCover South Australia 1998c; Heskett 1996, p. 7; Warshaw and Messite 1996, p. 996; Wynne et al. 1996, p. 9).

Retail food or convenience stores operating in evening hours are at higher risk. Australian convenience stores are usually open seven days a week for extended hours, sell a range of items, are usually owner-operated, and most have few staff members on-site—particularly in the evenings. A five-year study of one town in Florida found 96 per cent of all convenience stores had

been robbed, 36 per cent of fast-food outlets, 21 per cent of service stations, and 16 per cent of liquor stores (Reiss and Roth 1993, p. 151). However, further analysis revealed that a small number of convenience stores were repeatedly robbed while others were never targeted. Bellamy (1996) explained this phenomenon in terms of stores being "attractive" or "unattractive" targets, with those that were perceived to be more difficult passed over and "easier" stores robbed repeatedly (see also National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) 1991, p. 4).

"Attractive" hold-up targets are situated in high-crime or high-vandalism areas, have minimum protection for workers, limited observation from passers-by, allow ready access to cars and freeways for get-away, and have a number of possible exits from the store (OSHA 1998, p. 4; Heskett 1996, p. 142). Nevertheless, rewards can be small—in half of all United States convenience store robberies, less than $50 was stolen (NACS 1991, p. 4). Thus, convenience stores have been called the "poor man's ATM" (Automatic Teller Machine) (Malcan 1993 cited in Bellamy 1996, p. 42). However, "fighting back" may not be wise:

> *A part-time sales assistant was working in an Australian family business when the shop was help up:*
>
> - *during the course of the robbery, a fight broke out between the sales assistant and one of the robbers; and*
>
> - *one robber pulled a shotgun out of a bag.*
>
> *Outcome: The sales assistant was shot and killed* (NOHSC 1999b, p. 1).

Grainger (1995) analysed 30 hold-ups and bag snatches across a number of outlets of a leisure-based organisation in Queensland. She found most robberies occurred at opening or closing times, and were committed by males carrying a gun (Grainger 1995, p. 281). Robbers frequently assumed the identity of a customer as a pretext to enter a small business, with solitary workers, workers on duty in the evening or night hours, and cleaners working after a store closed, at increased risk (CAL/OSHA 1995, p. 2). As the following example shows, pretending to be a customer affords an offender time to "check out" premises.

> *A hairdresser in an Australian country town was employed part-time in a salon in a small block of shops. She was at work giving a regular customer a shampoo:*
>
> - *a nearby worker heard two screams coming from the salon, and then the salon's back door slam. This worker looked out the window but did not see anyone, did not hear any further noise, and assumed that there was nothing wrong;*
>
> - *a short time later, the owner of the salon arrived and found both the hairdresser and the customer fatally stabbed in the neck; and*
>
> - *a few weeks before the incident, the hairdresser had mentioned a "horrible man with creepy eyes" visiting the shop to have his hair cut who had mentioned that he would be back.*
>
> *Outcome: As only a small amount of money was stolen from the salon, robbery did not appear to be the only motive for the homicides. A man was seen in a passageway near the salon at about the time of the murders. No one was ever identified as the murderer* (unpublished data from Driscoll et al. 1999).

The Overlap Between Instrumental and Non-Instrumental Violence in Licensed Premises

Robbery-related violence, intoxication, and aggression can be inter-linked. As with all premises with cash-on-hand (and cashed-up customers), robbery-related violence is common in and around licensed premises as inebriation may weaken patrons' normal behavioural restraints. Further, alcohol has been correlated with aggression in a range of scenarios. Thus, hospitality environments can experience unpredictable bursts of aggression from clientele who are inebriated, exuberant, or on holiday away from the "normal" constraints on behaviour (Mayhew and Quinlan 1996). Young, casual and inexperienced staff may be less equipped to deal with aggressive behaviour, yet many job opportunities for young workers are in the hospitality and services industries.

Strategies to Prevent Armed Hold-Ups and Robberies

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

The "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design" (CPTED) concept is aimed at understanding the aspects of building design that encourage or discourage criminal behaviour (including robbery-related violence) at or near premises (OSHA 1998, p. 4; Warshaw and Messite 1996, p. 1003; Kennedy 1993, p. 117; Thomas 1992, p. 61; Geason and Wilson 1989, pp. 2–10). That is, risks are eliminated through design or redesign of the worksite and the immediate surrounding area. CPTED is principally aimed at prevention through the work of architects, engineers, building owners and landscape gardeners.

During the building design stage, there are some underlying principles that aid natural security: "territoriality", "natural surveillance", and "image".

(a) The "territoriality" principle assumes that people will defend their own and nearby territory. Thus a "good" design encourages people to express their territorial urges and defend their "own" area from outsiders, such as through control of access to a block of professional offices (Geason and Wilson 1989, p. 5).

(b) The "natural surveillance" principle is the way in which a property has been designed so that it is overlooked and watched by others going about their normal activities. Residents are most likely to do this if they have developed a territorial instinct and feel in some measure responsible for general safety in the area (Geason and Wilson 1989, p. 5). Similarly, the presence of numerous workers who can observe potential criminal activity in nearby premises is likely to diminish the overall incidence of crime, including robbery-related violence.

(c) "Image" refers to the appearance of a building and harmony with the activities that take place near it. Thus, a well-kept building may not attract offenders, but a run-down structure with graffiti may attract further criminal activity (Kennedy 1993, p. 117).

Minimising Risk: Target Hardening, Increasing Visibility and Reducing Rewards

Three core principles for armed hold-up and robbery prevention (and hence minimisation of robbery-related violence) are frequently cited: (a) "target

hardening" (making access to potential rewards more difficult);
(b) "increasing visibility" (such as surveillance of customers); and
(c) "reducing the rewards" (removing inducements such as cash) (OSHA
1998, p. 6; Bellamy 1996; Clarke 1992 cited in Ferreira 1995, p. 156). These
three principles underlie most robbery reduction strategies—and hence
prevention of violence associated with robberies. To a large extent, this
three-principle deterrence strategy assumes that potential robbers make
rational choices based on risk-reward trade-offs.

(a) "**Target hardening**" approaches involve engineering design or re-design
of the workplace in order to make armed hold-ups and robberies more
difficult (OSHA 1998, p. 4). Such strategies could include security grills on
windows and improved door locks. There are a series of other engineering
controls that can be implemented to reduce the risks:

- reduce face-to-face contact if cash is being exchanged. Such strategies
  could include installation of ATMs, or security glass windows for
  employees who pay out or take payments from customers;

- use of cheques, credit cards, electronic transfers or tokens wherever
  possible;

- change of layout in areas such as bars, for example, wider and higher
  counters with raised floor heights on staff side;

- removal of potential weapons such as scissors and paper spikes, and use
  of paper clips instead;

- use of coded security locks to restrict public access to specific areas; and

- installation of electronic sensors that emit a sound when customers (and
  potential offenders) enter or exit premises.

(WWA 1999a, p. 8; Chappell and Di Martino 1998, p. 114; NIOSH 1997, p. 4;
Lamplugh 1994, pp. 6–7; WorkCover New South Wales 1994, p. 7;
Seger 1993.)

Security measures will need to be regularly upgraded and evaluated to stay
ahead of innovative criminals who are usually on the look-out for weak
spots. Thus prevention of robbery-related violence (and robbery) requires
on-going monitoring and updating, and day-to-day involvement in

prevention by all employees. However, a significant critique of the "target hardening" prevention approach is that:

> …*some security experts are convinced that the greater the degree of protection provided for staff, then the greater the degree of force/violence which offenders are likely to employ during an incident. In security jargon, the harder the target the harder it could be hit.* (Reynolds 1994 cited in Wynne et al. 1996, p. 7)

(b) "**Increasing visibility**" approaches focus on improving the identification of offenders. Arguably, criminals seek out the shortest route, spend the least time, and identify the easiest means to accomplish their activity (Geason and Wilson 1989, p. 7). Thus, if the risk of an offender being caught is increased, this may act as a deterrent. By careful design of buildings and fittings in retail areas to increase visibility, likely offenders can be discouraged.

Ideally, an activity that attracts criminals is placed where many passers-by and other activities deter criminal action because potential witnesses reduce the "attractiveness" of a target to an offender. This principle has been applied in many areas where cash interchanges occur: ATMs in Australia are now routinely placed near high-pedestrian or high traffic areas for maximum visibility; for example, near pedestrian crossings or at busy road intersections. Similarly when selecting a site for a retail or convenience store, a site near traffic lights, petrol stations, major intersections or fast-food outlets increases the number of potential witnesses—and deters violence-prone robbers. Another prevention strategy is to increase the number of other customers on retail sites. Since evening hours tend to be higher-risk, natural surveillance can be enhanced by increasing customer numbers at peak times; for example, free coffee can be offered to police officers, security guards or taxi drivers working in the evening (Bellamy 1996, p. 48).

Poor in-store visibility and obstructed windows in stores are highly rated by would-be robbers; thus, good lighting is of core importance to prevention during evenings or at night. Notably, many convenience store, video outlet and service station robberies and hold-ups occur in evening and night hours. Hence, employers and owners should aim to have brightly-lit stores, and the front windows should be totally clear of advertisements or stored items. The placement of cash registers within a store should be carefully considered: registers can be located in the centre of stores, or near an exit that is in full view of passers-by. The probability of victimisation is higher if registers are at the back or where the cashier cannot be seen by passers-by (Bellamy 1996, p. 48). Other strategies include surveillance by Closed Circuit Television

(CCTV) or video cameras, improved interior and exterior lighting, use of mirrors in obscure corners, door alarms, bar codes on items, and removal of bushes near entrances or in car parks—where an assailant could hide (Hancock 1995, p. 19; Kennedy 1993, pp. 116, 119).

> *…police on patrol, should be able to see into the store. Employees in the store should have an unobstructed view of the street, clear of shrubbery, trees or any form of clutter that a criminal could use to hide. Signs located in windows should be either low or high to allow good visibility into the store. The customer service and cash register areas should be visible from outside the establishment. Shelves should be low enough to assure good visibility throughout the store. Convex mirrors, two-way mirrors, and an elevated vantage point can give employees a more complete view of their surroundings. …The parking area and the approach to the retail establishment should be well lit during nighttime hours of operation. Exterior illumination may need upgrading in order to allow employees to see what is occurring outside the store.*
> (OSHA 1998, p. 6)

Prominently displayed signs stating that monitoring of the site is continuous may further reduce the risk of robbery-related violence. While robbers often wear masks, video recording can still pick up identifying features such as tattoos (Bellamy 1996, p. 47).

A series of convenience stores in Florida were robbed by a man wearing a mask:

- *an on-site camera in one convenience store took a blurry photograph of a robber;*

- *police door-knocked units in an apartment building near the recently robbed store in an attempt to find a resident who could identify the robber from the photograph;*

- *a man answered his door wearing the clothing clearly visible in the picture; and*

- *he asked the police "can I help you?".*

Outcome: The man was convicted on the strength of the (poor) photographic evidence (cited in Bellamy 1996, p. 47).

Some detailed auditing guidelines to reduce the risks of robbery-related violence and other aggressive behaviours in car parks and gardens near worksites have been produced. Obvious poor designs include narrow dark underpasses or lanes leading to public transport which would be ideal for assailants to hide in, or poorly lit car parks with many perimeter bushes. Risk factors checked during an audit can include: lighting, sightlines, possible assault sites, isolation (sight and hearing capacity), escape routes, nearby land use, movement predicability, signs, and overall design and maintenance (Administrative Services Department (ASD) 1993, pp. 28–32). One research study found disorganised and dirty stores were more likely to be robbed (Roesch and Winterdyk 1986 cited in Bellamy 1996, p. 47). Conversely, well-maintained and clean buildings with tidy surroundings outside the building discourage potential offenders from loitering in the area (Cardy 1992, p. 108). This has sometimes been called the "broken windows" effect.

(c) "**Reducing the rewards**" strategies revolve around minimising cash and valuables available to a potential robber. Arguably, by reducing the potential rewards from robbery, offenders will be discouraged. Many of these "reward reduction" strategies involve both engineering and administrative controls.

The primary objective should be to keep as little money in the till and on the premises as possible. Staff should be trained to deposit larger notes immediately (out of customer view) into drop safes, or time-release safes. Frequent bank deposits should be made (at irregular times and via various routes), although exit from the premises carrying the cash to a vehicle may be a high-risk time. Clarke and McGrath (1990) found that cash reduction strategies (including a time-lock cash box, a cash limit of $500 on withdrawals, and the fitting of a main safe with an adjustable time lock) were responsible for a significant drop in TAB robberies in Victoria.

Potential robbers need to be clearly warned that little cash is kept on-site. That is, if they believe there is little reward for their effort, and a high probability of detection, armed robbery, and robbery-related violence, may be averted.

Administrative Controls that Reduce Armed Hold-Ups and Robbery-Related Violence

Procedural changes to reduce robbery-related violence can include improved cash handling procedures, planning and implementation of emergency

communication systems, and increasing the number of employees and customers on-site.

If an armed robber is known to have escaped from prison, or a gang is operating in the area or industry sector, the identity and usual method of operation of the offender or gang, and the nature of the risks, should be provided by the police or authorities to all relevant staff.

Night trading poses additional risks of armed hold-up and robbery-related violence for retail outlets, hence additional prevention strategies must be implemented (OSHA 1998, p. 4). Jeffress (1998, p. 2) argues for site-specific risk reduction strategies during night-time trading. For example, managers of facilities that back on to a wooded area might increase lighting at the rear of the store, rear doors should always be locked, and deliveries restricted to daylight hours. A liquor store in a high crime area could increase staffing at night and restrict customer access to only one door. Specific procedures will need to be established for emptying the garbage (typically done through the rear door), for the first worker arriving at the establishment who opens-up before trading, and for the last to leave who will be locking-up after the business closes (OSHA 1998, p. 7). Knowledge about such security procedures will need to be kept secret, the measures will have to be changed regularly, and the effectiveness monitored. Employers should also assess whether journeys to and from work are safe for staff working in the evenings or at nights, and adopt procedures to reduce the risks—especially for those who carry access keys or are conveying the last takings to a bank deposit chute.

Those who work alone will need additional security. This additional protection might include periodic checking of their well-being, the supply of personal alarms and mobile phones, or visual checking at regular intervals by workers in adjacent premises.

Bellamy (1996, p. 51) has suggested that unannounced on-site monthly security checks be conducted to check the operational efficiency of administrative controls for safety and security. Such checks are already common for service and product quality control in Australian fast-food outlets, for example, through what are known as "mystery" customers.

However, reliance on administrative controls alone is unlikely to be effective. Notably an analysis of hold-ups and bag-snatches at a leisure-based organisation with a number of outlets recommended that prevention

strategies should be based on the OHS "hierarchy of control" method (Grainger 1995, p. 281).

In the OHS hierarchy of control approach, elimination of the hazard is the preferred option. If elimination is not possible, substitution with a less hazardous work process or improved equipment or technology is preferred. The third choice is re-design of the equipment or work process to reduce the risks. The fourth choice is isolation of the hazard. As a last resort, administrative controls and use of appropriate personal protective equipment is selected to reduce the risks (see Division of Workplace Health and Safety (DWH&S) 2000, p. 13).

Possible Post-Incident Consequences from Armed Hold-Ups and Robberies

Workers who have experienced violence, or the threat of violence, during the course of an armed hold-up or robbery can experience any or all of the following:

- loss of self-esteem and self-doubt;

- irritability and insomnia;

- grief, guilt and depression;

- disturbed relationships with family and friends;

- increased heart rate;

- frightening dreams;

- physical illnesses;

- difficulties with performing tasks at home;

- absenteeism and fear of returning to work;

- decreased ability to interact freely with customers;

- feelings of incompetence and performance difficulties;

- fear of criticism from managers;

- increased use of caffeine, nicotine, alcohol, and medication;

- phobias and hallucinations; and

- Post-traumatic stress disorder.

(CAL/OSHA 1998, pp. 4, 16; WorkCover New South Wales 1994, p. 15)

The impacts on victims are not necessarily correlated with the severity of injury. For example, an uninjured survivor whose colleague was killed during an armed hold-up may be severely traumatised. These emotional sequelae on victims, and productivity decrements, usually remain unrecognised—unless significant workers' compensation or common law payments are awarded.

A man had a stable childhood and family life and was employed as a bank officer for nearly thirty years:

- *one day "a spaced out drug-nut waving a pistol" held up the bank where he worked;*

- *a year later during a second hold-up, a man wearing a motor cycle helmet pointed a double barrelled shotgun at him at close range;*

- *he suffered vivid regular nightmares for months after the second hold-up and three years later was still having intrusive "recalls" during the day;*

- *one day a customer walked into the bank with a motorcycle helmet on and the bank officer "froze"; and*

- *subsequently, there was a minor altercation with an abusive customer, and another staff member questioned his capacity to do his job.*

Outcome: His condition deteriorated and he had time off. When he attempted to enter any bank branch, he had panic attacks and starting shaking and crying and ran away. Chronic post-traumatic stress disorder was diagnosed.
(unpublished case notes)

Cook et al. (1999, pp. 14–39) have described the impact on *victims* in impressive detail. While their monograph includes a range of crimes, it is likely that the impact from violence experienced during robberies and armed hold-ups on worksites is similar to the consequences from other violent crimes. It is also clear that post-crime trauma can impede victims' ability and willingness to formally report the incident. The impacts on the victim can include serious physical injuries, emotional and behavioural consequences— which can be long-term and very debilitating—as well as financial difficulties (Cook et al. 1999, pp. 11–37). Victims who have been injured or whose lives have been threatened tend to be more disturbed in the longer-term (Davis, cited Cook et al. 1999, p. 19). Thus, the personal emotional

trauma and business costs from violent incidents may be considerable even when no physical injury results from the event(s).

> *I began to have flashbacks of the gunman, and nightmares, where I'd break out in cold sweats, and wake up screaming. I even started dreaming of different scenarios, but with the same man. I went through about 7 months of insomnia; I was lucky if I could sleep through a night once a week* (victim of armed robbery cited in Cook et al. 1999, p. 27).

The families of those killed on a worksite also suffer:

> *You never come to terms with an industrial death. My health has never been the same. I can't sleep at night. What has basically kept me going are my other two children…* (cited in Mobayad 1998, p. 78)

There are significant financial impacts on the *employer* as well as the victim, these costs are missing from most cost accounting calculations (Reynolds 1994, pp. 34–37). Potential economic consequences include: (a) decreased productivity through high levels of anxiety, stress-related illness, and turnover amongst victims; (b) diminished profitability and higher insurance premiums which may endanger business viability; and (c) reduced clientele in high-risk sites. (See Randall 1997, p. 57; Wynne et al. 1996, p. 16; UNISON 1996; Reynolds 1994, pp. 35–36; Cardy 1992, p. 32).

Post-Violent Incident Support Needs

Sensitive and appropriate support can reduce the suffering of a person who has been subjected to violence during an armed hold-up. Criticism or perceived criticism from an employer, a supervisor, or a coworker can be a major factor causing on-going emotional problems after an incident (WorkCover New South Wales 1994, p. 15). Social support from family and friends is vital to recovery and adjustment—without "blaming of the victim" in any way (Cook et al. 1999, p. 42).

Since it is impossible to guarantee that an armed hold-up or robbery-related violence will never occur in a retail establishment, it is sensible to pre-plan for victim after care services. Research evidence shows that immediate debriefing after the event is important to avoid long-term effects. In addition, in the immediate aftermath counselling, support and care from co-workers and management, time-off to recover, reimbursement of expenses (such as replacement of damaged clothing or spectacles), protection of earnings, and legal help should all be provided (Bibby 1995, pp. 93–99). Those who have experienced violence are also likely to require the support

of a number of services including emergency and crisis interventions, a coordinated approach to information provision, appropriate and empathetic responses from those within the criminal justice system, timely information, and assistance with understanding court proceedings. These needs have been detailed in-depth in Cook et al. (1999, pp. 45–64, 89–121). Occasionally, those who have witnessed or experienced severe threats may develop Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). This is a long-term chronic and debilitating condition that is diagnosed when several key indicators are present, including hyper-vigilance, repeated frightening and intrusive recalls of the event during the day, nightmares, and an escalation of symptoms after months. Professional specialist care is essential, sometimes for long periods of time (Bibby 1995, p. 94).

Workers who have been injured or traumatised by an armed hold-up or through robbery-related violence may be unable to perform previous duties (Spry 1998, p. 241). If the victim is unable to perform his or her former duties as a result of the incident(s), a change of duties or location should be arranged if possible, without prejudice to future prospects. If such victims are dismissed and due process has not been followed, federal or state unfair dismissal legislation may be used for re-instatement or compensation. In circumstances where an offender is convicted but no money can be recovered for the victim, it may be possible for the sufferer to apply for an ex gratia payment from the state (Payne 1992, p. 57). Criminal injury compensation stipulations and amounts vary by jurisdiction, and are usually limited. Those who are permanently incapacitated through such violence may also be able to access superannuation benefits earlier than would normally be the case. Such persons might include those who have suffered a severe injury or PTSD.

The major goal for the organisation should be identification and control of the risks so future armed hold-up and robbery-related violent incidents do not occur.

What the Law Requires

Armed hold-ups and robberies are criminal matters and police should be notified immediately. Similarly, any assaults committed during the course of a hold-up should be routinely reported to the authorities.

In addition, other forms of legislation apply. Statutory law in Australia states that employers have a primary duty to ensure, so far as is practicable, the OHS of all people on a worksite. This requirement is detailed under the duty of care provisions in the OHS legislation in each Australian State and Territory, which includes protection of workers from foreseeable risks (as well as members of the public who are visiting a worksite such as a café or a pub). The preventive thrust of the OHS legislation requires inspection of the worksite and work process to identify and control risks. The process of risk identification, risk assessment and risk control is explicit under the OHS Acts or subsidiary legislation in most Australian States and Territories. This process includes identification of the extent and the nature of risks, the changes necessary to eliminate or control the risks, and monitoring and evaluation of the risk control process.

An employer who has experienced or is aware of the potential for armed hold-ups can be presumed to expect further similar acts, and it would be assumed that a prevention program had been implemented. For example, sites known to be at high risk of late night retail hold-ups have "foreseeable risks" and would be expected to have effective security and violence prevention measures together with appropriate administrative controls.

A woman was working alone at a real estate office in inner Sydney. A man in a leather jacket entered the office and produced a shotgun:

- *the man forced the barrel of the shotgun into the woman's mouth and up and down her spine, buttocks and between her legs;*
- *the assailant threatened to "blow her head off" if she did not give him money;*
- *he took petty cash from a tin, the safe and the woman's handbag; and*
- *the woman subsequently developed post-traumatic stress disorder, attempted suicide, and was unable to return to full-time employment.*

Outcome: On 21 June 2000 Judge Puckeridge of the New South Wales District Court ruled that the woman's employer had failed in its duty of care by allowing her to work alone in a position in which she was not clearly visible from the outside, by not providing ready access to a security alarm button, not supplying a time-delay safe, and not displaying signs stating that there was no cash on premises. That is, the real estate firm had not taken appropriate steps to maximise employee safety. The woman was awarded $792,271 in compensation. However, this judgement and award will be appealed by the WorkCover insurer (Knowles, 22 June 2000, pp. 1, 4).

Most of the Australian State and Territory OHS authorities have published cash control and robbery prevention advice, often in cooperation with the police, Neighbourhood Watch and industry associations. (The website address of each Australian OHS jurisdiction is listed at the end of this handbook.) Inspectorate enforcement of armed hold-up prevention may well be strengthened in the future. For example, in the United States, OHS inspectors regularly issue citations based on the premise that workplace security must be part of any comprehensive OHS plan (Peek-Asa and Howard 1999, p. 652).

New South Wales is currently the only Australian state where a secretary of a union is permitted to institute proceedings for breaches of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (s48), providing the union has a member in that workplace. Under this little-used provision, the Finance Sector Union is currently prosecuting the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in relation to a hold-up in August 1999. It is alleged that the union had warned bank management staff of security problems four months prior to a hold-up, but this warning was ignored (Tooma 2000, p. 8).

Victims of violence committed during armed hold-ups and robberies may also pursue remedies under common law. Common Law breaches of the duty of care are usually founded on four basic principles: the foreseeability of the event, causation, preventability, and reasonableness. The more foreseeable the risk, the greater the duty to prevent. Thus, the more foreseeable a robbery-related violent crime, the greater the duty to provide security.

> There is a trend, however, to find for plaintiffs where inadequate security measures have been taken, particularly if the risk of criminal attack is determined to have been reasonably foreseeable. Some premises liability cases have involved architects and engineering professionals where it has been argued that negligent design and/or site selection contributed to the likelihood crime would occur. Principles of environmental criminology can be utilized to determine if there is actual notice that crime is reasonably foreseeable by looking at official and unofficial records. …Increasingly, courts are imposing such a duty on commercial and residential landlords to the extent that the safety and security of business invitees must become paramount.
> (Kennedy 1993, pp. 105, 118)

The elements of a negligence tort where security adequacy is under question include:

- defendant owed a duty to act reasonably;

- warning signs were present;

- there was a failure to act reasonably; and

- this failure was a primary cause of the injury.

(McMurry 1995 p. 12; Spain 1990 cited Kennedy 1993, p. 108.)

A Michigan office block had several business tenants:

- *a number of tenants had raised safety concerns with the landlord;*

- *however, the landlord took no security measures and gave no warnings;*

- *the employee of one tenant was assaulted by a patient attending a mental health clinic in the building; and*

- *evidence was provided to the jury about the patient's known violent tendencies.*

Outcome: One commentator found that a circumspect security manager would have assessed neighbouring populations and the need for additional security measures (Samson v Saginaw Professional Building, 224 NW 2d 843; Kennedy 1993, p. 113).

In addition to implementing engineering controls, employers will need to develop workplace procedures that reduce the risk of robbery-related violence, design cash control procedures, and ensure staff have been fully trained and have practiced appropriate ways of dealing with emergency situations (WorkCover South Australia 1998c, p. 1).

The Risk Identification, Assessment and Control Process

The process of risk identification, risk assessment and risk control is now standard practice to control OHS risks in Australian jurisdictions. Armed hold-ups and robbery-related violence are most readily controlled through the same process. Evidence from a number of countries indicates that it is generally the larger organisations that have undertaken preventive initiatives with interventions less common in small business (Wynne et al. 1996, p. 27). However, there has been very little (publicly available) evaluation of the effectiveness of many preventive interventions (Peek-Asa and Howard 1999, p. 648).

Demonstrated top management and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) commitment to armed hold-up prevention is of core importance. Some baseline possible documents have been included in this report to assist employers and employees. These possible documents are generic tools and will need to be adapted and tailored to reduce the specific risk factors within each individual organisation. The commitment to prevention of armed hold-up and robbery-related violence should be clearly stated in the organisational mission statement (see possible statement in Appendix 1) and through a prevention policy (Appendix 2). Both should be publicly displayed and widely disseminated.

Risk Identification

A formal risk identification process identifies the extent and the nature of risks, the circumstances under which armed hold-up risks are more pronounced, as well as the potential and contributing factors. In the discussion below, "at-risk" premises have been distinguished from "at-risk" people.

"At-risk" Premises

If armed hold-ups and robberies and other forms of violence (such as vandalism) have occurred in the past, the frequency, severity, and characteristics of incidents need to be formally documented. Proper documentation of violent incidents is important for an organisation to learn by its experiences, and this documentation needs to be reviewed at the highest level. Even small convenience stores can readily identify some high-risk situations. For example, poor lighting, evening trading in a high-risk neighbourhood, or absence of drop safes. Larger outlets will have more detailed risk identification strategies.

"At-risk" People

Relying on individual profiles is a dangerous practice as armed hold-ups and robbery-related violence have been committed by a spectrum of people under a variety of circumstances. While there are no reliable indicators of dangerousness, there are certain characteristics that indicate a capacity for violence. Young single men, low socio-economic status, high residential mobility, those with an existing mental illness, or those with an addiction may be higher risk (Bowie and Malcolm 1989). Characteristics of potential offenders can also include those who "check out" premises prior to hold-ups; for example, they may browse for long periods and then purchase only a cheap and obvious item. Or, potential offenders may drive their cars past the store slowly on more than one occasion. Situational characteristics compound these risks, such as access to weapons, easy contact with intended victims, and the use of disinhibiting substances (Cherry and Upston 1997; Vandenbos and Bulatao 1996, p. 104).

> *Although amphetamines increase the excitability of the user and perhaps increase the potential for violence. …Also important in understanding the link between amphetamines and crime is the effect of withdrawal from amphetamines. A number of offenders referred to the agitation associated with coming down off amphetamines ("looping out").*
> (Indermaur 1995, p. 185)

Risk Assessment

Regular *systematic* robbery-related violence audits/ risk assessments are an important part of the preventive strategy and provide the baseline for prevention planning by businesses (Appendix 3). The level of detail in risk assessments should be broadly proportional to the risk. There should be objective assessment of the probability and likely severity of an incident, and an evaluation of the effectiveness of existing control measures (see WWA 1999a). Those responsible need to identify what measures have been taken to address warning signs, ascertain if the preventive strategies implemented have been adequate and whether the outcomes have been objectively evaluated. The aim is to deal with the potential situation before the incident occurs and eliminate or reduce the risks. Wishful thinking ("armed hold-ups cannot happen in this business") should be avoided.

During risk assessment, all available information needs to be recorded with a separate incident form completed for each event (Appendix 4). It is important that *all* incidents be recorded. Incidents of threats by customers that do not result in a physical injury or robbery should all be recorded as such behaviours indicate a potential for future tragedies. The timespan within which incidents must be formally reported in the organisation should be specified; for example, immediately if possible but not later than three working days. Past incident records need to be grouped, analysed and the patterns identified. Facts are required on "who, what, when, where and why".

Incident Investigation Schedule

The following facts are required.

- Type of incident—for example, assault, robbery.

- Severity of injury sustained, such as emotional, minor or major injury.

- Who was threatened or assaulted and their occupation.

- If known, type of customer who committed the threat, assault, or robbery.

- Activity, such as masquerading as customer.

- Specific area where robbery or violent incident occurred such as outside bar.

- Any weapons used or displayed.

- The number of employees on duty at the time of the incident.

- Any other high-risk customers present.

- Time of day or night and day of week.

- How the incident arose and progressed (narrative data).

- Possible causes and contributing factors—for example, significant amount of cash well known to be on premises.

- Time when police were called, names of officers and any reports issued.

- What preventive strategies were in place, and how effective these were.

- What actions victims took during incident, and any impact on outcomes.

- Lost time and cost losses sustained.

- Corrective action and follow-up recommendations.

(OSHA 1998, p. 5; Long Island Coalition 1996, p. 28.)

Individuals who are the victim of armed hold-ups or robberies with violence should also keep a record of the incident(s) and remedial actions implemented at the workplace (Appendix 5).

A *verbal* as well as a written robbery-related violence audit should be conducted at regular intervals (see possible survey form in Appendix 6). The aim of this verbal audit is to find out if minor incidents are not being reported for fear of further victimisation by the offender. It is important that independent and trusted people do this verbal stocktake, for example, union representatives, OHS or security committee members. This process may identify what really happens—as opposed to instructions, official policies and written records. Evidence suggests robberies may be repeated over time if intervention strategies are not implemented.

Economic influences should be considered during the robbery-related violence audit/ risk assessment. For example, financial restrictions might require staff to work alone in a convenience or video store in the evenings rather than two employees being on-site. If there are two or more shifts, the patterns of robbery and violence should be compared between shifts as the risks may vary at different times of the day and night (WCBBC (Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia) 1995, p. 4). Comparison of the robbery and violence profile with industry sector norms for that geographical area, size of business, or time of day or night, will help identify higher-risk situations. Such *grouped* information may be available from police or insurance organisations. For example, in a New York city study of crime in small businesses, it was estimated that the average value of stolen property was $US10,476, damaged property $US4,202, and increased investment in security was $US7,341 (Gallagher et al. 1989 cited in Fisher and Looye 2000, p. 52). Many retailers reported further losses through a reduction in sales as customers avoided areas where their safety could be compromised, and employees often became more difficult to recruit (Gallagher et al. 1989 cited in Fisher and Looye 2000, p. 52).

Feedback on the formal and informal robbery-related violence risk assessment process and evaluation should be provided to all staff. If no problems are found, suspicions may be allayed (WCBBC 1995, p. 4; Lamplugh 1994, pp. 4–5).

Risk Control

The risk control process should be introduced systematically, based on objective evidence. The overt commitment of management and the CEO to robbery-related violence prevention is of core importance, as are engineering controls that reduce inducements to robbery (such as "target hardening").

Under the standard "hierarchy of control" approach to reducing OHS risks in Australia, the preference is elimination of the hazard (see discussion on page 18. If the risks cannot be totally eliminated, then work environment arrangements should be reconfigured to minimise the risks, for example, by implementing cash control strategies such as time-delayed cash release safes. Such arrangements could also include irregular bank deposit times and routes (WCBBC 1995, p. 4). The hierarchy of control approach to the prevention of armed hold-ups and robberies is also evident in the "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design" concepts discussed earlier in this handbook.

United States authorities argue on-site controls must include "universal precautions" which are integrated into all settings, with administrative methods developed to ensure "float" staff, new personnel, and changeover shifts are warned of potentially violent customers and situations (CAL/OSHA 1998, p. 11; Reich and Dear 1996, pp. 399–415). OSHA (1998) developed a detailed guidance document that may be particularly useful for liquor outlets, service stations and convenience stores—many features of which are included in the discussion below and in the appendices. There has to be widespread communication of the armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention policy and strategies, although some aspects such as cash handling procedures may need to be kept secret. A mix of risk control measures will usually be most effective (Peek-Asa and Howard 1999, p. 648; Schneid 1998, p. 24; Nalla et al. 1996, p. 95). Unfortunately, publicly available evidence on the effectiveness of intervention strategies is limited.

Some detailed possible robbery-related violence prevention security procedures are listed in Appendix 7. For workers who have to deliver goods off-site, there may be additional risks, for example pizza home deliveries. Hence, possible guidelines to prevent violence to off-site workers are provided in Appendix 8.

In organisations whose core business is dealing with the public, a balance needs to be maintained between creating a welcoming relaxing environment and process of delivering the service, while ensuring the safety of staff and other customers. The balance will need to be worked out for each industry sector, specific site, and according to the degree of risk (WorkCover South Australia 1998c; Cardy 1992, p. 106).

In the event of violent behaviour during an armed hold-up or robbery, staff should know exactly what to do. Possible routes of escape in the event of a

hold-up, or strategies to follow if employees are bound and gagged, may need to be considered for high-risk worksites. Staff should aim to protect themselves and not put themselves and other staff and customers at risk (Cardy 1992, p. 114). The primary aim is for the robbery to be completed as quickly and as smoothly as possible. Hence cash, valuables and goods should be given to robbers on request. Most robberies are completed within two minutes—the longer it takes the more nervous the robber becomes and hence the risk of violence increases.

Possible guidelines for staff to follow during a robbery or hold-up are detailed in Appendix 9. Unfortunately, hold-ups occasionally result in the hostage-taking of staff. This is likely to be a rare event. Nevertheless, in Appendix 10 some possible strategies that may assist with hostage survival are listed.

Training for armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention should be included in all induction and re-training courses as well as for "at-risk" staff. Records of this training should be kept. Topics discussed should include the prevention policy and strategies in place; risk identification, assessment and control procedures; warning signs of potential violence and appropriate responses; cash control procedures; security provisions; emergency action plans; and administrative and incident reporting procedures. It should be impressed on staff that the failure to report minor incidents, such as suspicious persons loitering outside premises, may put others at risk during a later more severe incident. However, using training as the sole violence prevention strategy is unlikely to be successful.

A possible outline of an armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention training course appears as Appendix 11, and the resources needed are listed in Appendix 12.

OHS and Security Committee Planning to Prevent Armed Hold-Ups and Robbery-Related Violence in Large or Medium-Sized Organisations or Chains of Convenience Stores

The OHS and security committees have a central role in any comprehensive armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention strategy. Tasks and strategies overseen should include security arrangements, identification of high-risk times and activities, emergency and crisis response planning, links with police and security personnel, post-incident supports, training programs, the introduction of interventions, and the monitoring and evaluation process.

Management nominees, elected employee representatives, and all those with OHS and security responsibilities should be members of the committee. Ideally, an equal number of employer and employee representatives will be appointed/elected (see specific OHS regulatory requirements and duties for each Australian State and Territory). Employees are more likely to be committed to the armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention policy and strategies if they or their representatives have input into the design of the risk assessment and risk control measures and are involved with putting them into action (OSHA 1998, p. 3). All committee members should take an active role to ensure that violence audits/risk assessments are comprehensive in coverage and that controls are adequately implemented. A violence contact officer should be nominated who is acceptable to all sections of the workforce, has established contact with local police, and his or her name should be widely publicised.

Minutes of OHS and security committee meetings should be recorded, and actions, interventions and evaluations filed and dated—and retained for at least 10 years to assist with evaluation of trends and preventive interventions. Records of all violence audits/ risk assessments, other inspections, and training conducted should be maintained (Appendices 3,4,6, and 11 and WWA 1999a). Any marked variations in the incidence of armed hold-ups or robbery-related violence by job task, time of day or night, or normal clientele profile should be noted. If records are kept up-to-date, improvements from interventions should be easy to track. Similarly, new and emerging risks will be clearly apparent.

Nightshift, work tasks requiring intense concentration, and unpredictable workloads can lead to fatigue and a diminished ability to recognise early warning signs of impending hold-ups, and to competently cope with any associated violence (Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 1987, p. 7). In high-risk jobs such as late-night convenience or video stores, the OHS and security committee should ensure that "at-risk" staff are alert and functioning to full capacity.

Changes in working procedures may be appropriate. For example, where cleaners work alone at night moving from floor to floor in a high-rise building such as a department store, their vulnerability would be reduced if they worked together cleaning one floor after the other, rather than working alone at different levels (WWA 1999a, p. 8). Similarly in a chain of convenience or video stores that operate in evening and night hours, a

mobile security guard could be shared, or the effectiveness of different preventive interventions could be evaluated across all outlets.

An important aspect in an armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention strategy is close liaison with local police officers. The OHS and security committee can ensure that security and procedures in the premises are independently formally assessed. The reporting of robberies, assaults and other serious criminal incidents to the police is legally required, and may also be crucial to subsequent investigations and as evidence in court. For example, as the incidence of PTSD has increasingly been recognised, it has also been found that symptoms often do not emerge for months after the event (Cembrowicz and Ritter 1994, p. 40). Hence, it is very important that violence threats, robberies and hold-ups, with or without physical injuries, are fully recorded.

A number of authorities have produced guidance for different "at-risk" sites. For example, the HSE publication *Preventing Violence to Retail Staff* (1995) has differently focused preventive advice to that in their publication *Prevention of Violence to Staff in Banks and Building Societies* (1993).

The OHS and security committee also needs to plan for potential emergencies on some sites; for example, an addicted or desperate customer threatening all other customers and staff on the premises with an automatic weapon (such as the Port Arthur massacre). Customised site-specific response plans can be developed. Following any severe violent event or threat, post-incident assessment, and evaluation of the effectiveness of security procedures should be routine.

Evaluation

Finally, the existing risk control measures should be evaluated. That is, have they prevented armed hold-ups and robbery-related violence? If not, the search for new preventive interventions should begin—which are also subsequently evaluated.

The full costs of robbery-related violence should be calculated, including violence-induced leave, workers' compensation claims, stress-related illness, downtime, industrial action or poor industrial relations, replacement staff, lost customers, robbery-related losses and breakages, equipment and stock replacement, and bad publicity for the organisation (Speer 1997, p. 10). As a guideline, Hancock (1995, p. 18) cited estimated costs of replacing an employee at between $35,000 to $47,000. (See also earlier discussion on

comparison with criminal activity norms for area and under the "Risk Assessment" section.) During costing calculations, allowance has to be made for the "normal" under-reporting of lower-level violence. Another important consideration is that incident recording procedures tend to be poor at enumerating sensitive emotional and psychological sequelae of violent incidents (Wynne et al. 1996, p. 45). These emotional sequelae have significant detrimental effects on productivity.

Finally, a detailed armed hold-up and robbery-related violence security audit and evaluation checklist is provided in Appendix 13. This has been divided into seven sections (a) overall security plan; (b) methods of control; (c) reviews undertaken by OHS committee; (d) risk assessment; (e) engineering controls; (f) administrative controls; and (g) policy and strategy evaluation.

The design and implementation of appropriate interventions may be challenging and involve difficult decisions. Shortcomings in commitment, resources, engineering controls, administrative procedures, and training and retraining should be clearly and courageously (where necessary) identified.

Conclusion

Armed hold-ups and robbery-related violence are most common in businesses that handle significant amounts of money. However, as security provisions have tightened, robbery targets have moved to retail establishments, service stations, taxi cabs, chemists, and hospitality and service organisations.

There are a number of robbery-prevention guides in Australia—many developed by police and security personnel. However, advice on prevention of violence to staff in situations such as hotels, video stores and smaller cafés is limited.

Comprehensive armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention strategies include the following.

(a) Elimination or minimisation of the risks through "target hardening", "increasing visibility", and "reducing the rewards" approaches; all of which have been found to be effective.

(b) Regular violence audits/risk assessments need to be conducted which include identification of high-risk times and situations, assessment of

organisational procedures and cash-handling strategies, risk controls incorporated in standard operating procedures, emergency plans, reporting systems, formal evaluation of security provisions, appropriate interventions with formal evaluation of these, and post-incident responses.

(c) Explicit management commitment to prevention can be demonstrated through provision of resources, and (in larger organisations) establishment of tripartite OHS and security committees.

(d) Adequate staffing and training programs are also important.

(Anfuso 1994, cited Standing and Nicolini 1997, p. 50; Dignam and Fagan 1996, p. 373; Long Island Coalition 1996).

As recognition of the problem grows, improved policies and strategies will undoubtedly emerge. Many employers now recognise that armed hold-ups and robbery-related violence have significant physical and emotional impacts on victims, and potentially large legal and economic consequences for employers. The first step in prevention is the development of an organisational policy and strategies that reduce inducements to robbery, and thus limit the risks of violence. As with other OHS and security problems, the risk identification, risk assessment and risk control process has been found to be an effective preventive strategy.

The possible policy, strategy and checklist documents provided in this handbook may form the foundation step, but these have to be modified to the particular circumstances and risks in specific retail and service outlets. Regular objective reviews of performance are essential. However, violence prevention does not exist separately to other parts of effective organisational planning. Each CEO or owner-manager needs to ensure that all workplace policies complement each other, and that the armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention policy and strategies are integrated with other policies and into standard operating procedures. Probably the most important step is unequivocal top management commitment to the prevention of armed hold-ups and robbery-related violence.

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Website addresses for further Occupational Health and Safety information and specific legislation in each Australian State and Territory:

Comcare: www.comcare.gov.au

The Division of Workplace Health and Safety (Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations, DETIR, Qld): www.detir.qld.gov.au

The National Occupational Health and Safety Commission: www.nohsc@gov.au

The Northern Territory Work Health Authority: www.nt.gov.au/wha

The Victorian WorkCover Authority: www.workcover.vic.gov.au

The WorkCover Corporation of South Australia: www.workcover.sa.gov.au

WorkCover New South Wales: www.workcover.nsw.gov.au

Workplace Standards Tasmania: www.wsa.tas.gov.au

WorkSafe Western Australia: www.safetyline.wa.gov.au

See also the Australian Institute of Criminology website for "Occupational Violence in Australia: An Annotated Bibliography of Prevention Policies, Strategies and Guidance Materials". Website: www.aic.gov.au, listed under directories.

Appendices: Possible Prevention Policy and Strategy Documents and Checklists

Appendix 1

Possible Mission Statement on Prevention of Armed Hold-Ups and Robbery-Related Violence

This organisation aims to provide a working environment that promotes courtesy, trust, and mutual respect across the workforce and to customers of our services. Our mission is to achieve "best practice" in the prevention of violence. All acts of abusive behaviour, harassment, intimidation, threats, and physical violence are expressly prohibited. We will work together with employees, security experts and government bodies to reduce robberies and hold-ups and other acts of violence. In order to ensure widespread adoption of our zero-tolerance policy, a consultative framework involving management, employees, others on-site, and security personnel will be maintained.

Appendix 2

Possible Armed Hold-Ups and Robbery-Related Violence Prevention Policy

It is the policy of (named organisation) to provide a safe work environment. We:

(a) recognise the potential for armed hold-up and robbery-related violence and undertake to do all that is reasonably practicable to eliminate or reduce the risks;

(b) will develop a prevention policy, strategies and guidelines tailored to this worksite and work process in consultation with the OHS and security committee;

(c) undertake to assess the potential for armed hold-up and robbery-related violence, to identify groups of workers especially at risk, take all practical steps to eliminate or reduce the risks, and to provide adequate budgetary resources;

(d) undertake to conduct regular robbery-related violence audits/risk assessments;

(e) will address the special risks for those working alone and after hours;

(f) require full reporting of all violent incidents, including threatening behaviours, abuse and intimidation from clients, members of the public and others;

(g) will take seriously and investigate all reports from employees about the potential for armed hold-up and robbery-related violence;

(h) will ensure all criminal behaviour and activity is reported to the police;

(i) will investigate all incidents through the tripartite OHS and security committee;

(j) agree that the CEO, all managers, supervisors and the OHS committee are responsible for implementing and maintaining the armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention program;

(k) will publicly identify the contact person responsible for the implementation of the armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention policy and strategies;

(l) require contractors on-site to abide by the armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention policy, and to adopt comparable security procedures *as part of normal contract conditions*;

(m) will, in consultation with the OHS and security committee and employee representatives, provide full training and regular retraining to workers who may be at risk to enable them to recognise potentially violent customers or situations;

(n) affirm that employees are instructed not to take risks on behalf of the employer to protect the employer's property;

(o) will provide support and care, including counselling and professional care where appropriate, to those who have experienced a violent incident;

(p) will agree to a change of duties or location for a person who is unable to perform their former duties as a result of armed hold-up and robbery-related violence, wherever possible, without prejudice to future prospects;

(q) will regularly monitor and evaluate the armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention policy and strategies in consultation with the OHS committee and employee representatives. Consultation will occur prior to the design of any new worksite or major change in work process; and

(r) will adopt legal counsel recommendations.

Date:..................... signed by CEO:.. Policy last updated:...................
(Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union (MSFU) 1994, 1995 cited in Chappell and Di Martino 1998, p. 98; Davis 1997, p. 175; Long Island Coalition 1996, p. 33; Heskett 1996, p. 64.)

Appendix 3

Possible Violence Audit/Risk Assessment Form

On (*insert date*) an armed hold-up and robbery-related violence audit was carried out.
The audit was conducted by:
Employer representative: ....
Employee representative: ....
OHS committee representative: ....
Security staff representative: ....
Records reviewed:
Armed hold-up and robbery incident reports since last audit, including any violence:
 ....
Violent incident reports since last audit: ....
"Near miss, near assault, near robbery" reports: ....
Insurance reports: ....
Missing goods, stock losses, or damage reports: ....
Police reports and liaison meetings (with date): ....
Training records: ....
Other relevant records: ....
From these records we have identified the following issues that need to be addressed:
 ....
 ....
"Walk-through" audit:
Security of building and surrounds and "attractiveness" to robbers: ....
Interior and exterior lighting: ....
Interior fittings and security measures: ....
Surveillance provisions: ....
Signs notifying public of limited cash on-site: ....
Cash control measures: ....
Working alone, isolated, evening hours: ....
From the "walk-through" violence audit, we have identified that the following issues
need to be addressed: ....
Semi-structured interviews with (anonymous) staff members:
Number of interviews conducted: ....
Areas of worksite and work process covered (only if does not identify individuals):
 ....
Customers and local areas issues of concern: ....
Working alone, isolated, evening hours: ....
From the interviews with staff, we have identified that the following issues need to be
addressed: ....
Overall risk controls recommended:
Engineering security controls: ....
Work area and work process: ....
Working alone, isolated, evening hours: ....
Emergency procedures and alarms: ....
Training: ....
Customers who may have to be restricted or prohibited, or for whom staff warnings
should be issued: ....
Adequacy of existing control measures: ....
Other risk controls recommended (resources required, proposed implementation date,
evaluation due date): ....
(adapted from Long Island Coalition 1996; CAL/OSHA 1995, p. 5. See alternative audits
in WorkCover South Australia 1998a, p. 22; WorkCover New South Wales 1996,
pp. 18–21.)

Appendix 4

Possible Armed Hold-Ups and Robbery-Related Violent Incident Report Form

Major incidents must be reported immediately to police and CEO or employer.
All minor incidents must be reported as soon as possible, and not later than 3 days.
A separate incident form is to be completed for each event.
All incidents of verbal threats, aggressive behaviour and robbery where no actual violence has occurred should be recorded as the pattern may indicate the need for strategies to prevent future tragedies.

Type of incident: ☐ abuse ☐ threats ☐ robbery ☐ assault ☐ homicide

Mechanism used: ☐ face-to-face ☐ phone ☐ letter ☐ other ....

Weapons involved: ☐ none ☐ gun ☐ knife ☐ fists ☐ other ....

Name of victim: .... Position (job task): ....

Name of offender (if known): ....

Address of offender (if known): ....

Description of suspect: ....

Police report, officer handling, time seen: ....

Time of occurrence: ☐ a.m. ☐ p.m.

Day of week: ☐ Sun. ☐ Mon. ☐ Tues. ☐ Wed. ☐ Thurs. ☐ Fri. ☐ Sat.

Location or area where incident took place: ....

Activity underway at time of incident: ....

Other persons present at time: ....

Video recording of incident: ☐ yes ☐ no ☐ inadequate

Nature of injuries sustained:

    Body part injured (such as arm/head): ....

    Type of injury (such as laceration/emotional): ....

Nature of armed hold-up, robbery or threat: ....

How the incident arose and progressed (narrative data): ....

....

Contributing causes: ....

....

Total lost time: Victim: .... hours: .... minutes: ....

                 Replacement staff: .... hours: .... minutes: ....

                 Investigator(s): .... hours: .... minutes: ....

Costs: Amount of cash taken:....................   Valuables taken: ....

       Equipment and building damage   Other:..

       Lost work time:................................   Replacement staff time: ....

       Estimated total costs: ....   Injury or illness costs: ....

Outcomes of incident (such as charges by police): ....

....

Date: .... Signature: .... (form last updated:............................)

(Long Island Coalition 1996) (See detailed suspect and vehicle description forms in OSHA 1998, pp. 13–14; and WCBBC 1995, p. 26.)

Appendix 5

Possible Record for File Kept By Victim of Armed Hold-Ups And Robbery-Related Violence

1. Written record or diary of all armed hold-ups, robberies, threats and physical attacks:
- each incident should be recorded separately;
- date, time, place;
- details of what happened; and
- name(s) of witnesses.

2. Correspondence following any incidents:
- all correspondence must be retained;
- statement(s) made by victim to deny or correct remarks, statements or claims by offender;
- statement(s) made by offender to deny or correct remarks, statements or claims by victim;
- date all statement(s) and enter the dates mailed or delivered to offender (or his or her solicitor);
- note if there has been a reply from offender or his or her representative (attach to record and date); and
- if there is no reply or response from offender (or his or her solicitor), this should be recorded

3. Records of correspondence between organisation, employer and victim:
- meeting(s) between organisational representatives and victim (or his or her representative), record date and names of those present;
- record verbal discussion notes, including telephone discussions (date, time, people involved); and
- Written correspondence (dated and copies filed).

4. Records of correspondence between victim and police:
- written correspondence with police (copies of all correspondence must be dated and filed);
- meeting(s) with police (date, names of those present);
- copies of any notes taken during these verbal discussions should be attached to the file; and
- copies of police records filed.

5. Correspondence and meetings with union delegate or officials:
- confidential meeting(s) with Union delegate or official (date, names of those present, items discussed);
- copies of any notes taken during these verbal discussions should be attached to the file;
- written correspondence with Union delegate or official (date and file all correspondence and copies);
- copies of correspondence forwarded by Union delegate or official on behalf of victim; and
- negotiations with employer over armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention strategies.

Guidance: always stick with the facts and avoid statements that could be interpreted as ill-feeling, personality conflicts, or personal dislike of offender (developed from UNISON 1996).

Appendix 6

Possible *Anonymous* Armed Hold-Up and Robbery-Related Violence Survey of Staff

The OHS and security committee requested this anonymous survey of staff to identify armed hold-up and robbery-related violence risks and potentially useful prevention methods. A person independent of the organisation undertook the survey, and only grouped data was returned to the company.
Date: ....

1. Armed hold-up and robbery-related violence policies and strategies:

Does your organisation have an armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention *policy*?
☐ yes ☐ no ☐ don't know

The policy here is: ☐ excellent ☐ fairly good ☐ okay ☐ not very good ☐ terrible

Does your organisation have an armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention *strategy*?
☐ yes ☐ no ☐ don't know

The strategy is: ☐ excellent ☐ fairly good ☐ okay ☐ not very good ☐ terrible

Does the organisation hold regular meetings so everyone can
discuss armed hold-up and robbery-related violence openly? ☐ yes ☐ no ☐ don't know
Is there an armed hold-up and robbery-related violence contact person? ☐ yes ☐ no ☐ don't know
Are there formal violence reporting procedures? ☐ yes ☐ no ☐ don't know

2. Armed hold-up and robbery-related violent experiences:

Do you know what to do if you think a robbery is imminent? ☐ yes ☐ no ☐ not sure
Have you experienced: ☐ abuse ☐ threats ☐ assaults ☐ robbery
Number of incidents in past 12 months (specify type): ....
If yes, who were they: ☐ known customer ☐ stranger
Please describe: ....
If yes, did you report this to anyone here:
☐ yes, on the report form ☐ yes, but informally ☐ no (please explain why not)
....
Have you missed work in the last 12 months because of a robbery or threat? ☐ yes ☐ no
If yes, please describe: ....
To your knowledge, has there been any other violence here? ☐ yes ☐ no ☐ don't know

3. Armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention training:

The training here was:
☐ excellent ☐ fairly good ☐ okay ☐ not very good ☐ terrible or useless
Violence training was provided to me: ☐ during induction only ☐ re-training (date):.........................
☐ at other organisation (name):.. (date):.......................... ☐ other (date):..........................

4. Action taken by organisation post-incident:

☐ investigated and made changes to fix situation ☐ investigated and made no changes
☐ made life difficult for me ☐ did not report incident ☐ other

5. Recommended changes: ....
....

(Long Island Coalition 1996. See alternative possible survey in Vandenbos and Bulatao 1996, p. 285.)

Appendix 7

Possible Armed Hold-Ups and Robbery-Related Violence Prevention Security Procedures

Security measures will have to be customised to site-specific risk factors.

(a) Environmental designs can include:

- customers and potential offenders are restricted from access to stock and cash areas, for example through key access only;
- rear entry areas are kept locked; fire doors are one-way egress only;
- physical barriers prevent access by non-staff to restricted working areas (delivery bays are locked except when in use or completely separate from customer areas);
- there are security locks or bars on all doorways and windows which are locked when premises are closed;
- tradesmen are screened and double-checked before they are allowed on-site;
- all clutter, signs, and obstructions have been removed from windows so that an unobstructed view of the store and service area counter and cash register exists;
- no unnecessary valuables are stored on-site; if valuable commodities have to be on-site, expert security advice is sought and implemented;
- there is bright and effective lighting in all high-risk areas of the site, including stairwells, car parks, and CCTV where appropriate;
- surveillance cameras record what goes on in higher-risk zones such as near cash registers;
- all weapons (including knives and screwdrivers) are banned and metal detectors are in place at the worksite where appropriate;
- emergency numbers are posted by the phone (police, ambulance, and manager);
- in stores, mirrors are mounted in the ceiling and at corners so hidden corners of remain in view of staff;
- glass in windows and doors near cash and stock areas is shatter-proof;
- additional security measures are in place if drugs are stored or being sold, such as in chemist shops;
- alarm systems can be activated in parts of premises not in use after hours while other parts remain in use;
- walkways between worksite and car park are well lit and designed to minimise potential hiding places;
- there are no obstacles to good visibility in the grounds, including no bushes near entrance or around car parks where assailants could hide (gardening tools are locked up so they cannot be used as weapons or to aid building access);
- if the point of sale is a drive-through facility, speed bumps are in exit lanes to reduce quick escapes, such as in bottle-order or fast-food outlets;
- offenders cannot readily gain access to the worksite through roof, rear doors, windows;
- there are simple height markers on exit doors to assist witnesses in estimating height of assailants leaving premises;

- maintenance, repair, testing and monitoring procedures are checked weekly;
- prominently displayed signs declare that the premises are security-monitored; and
- security services are employed after hours in high-risk crime areas.

(b) Cash security provisions can include:

- clear signs are posted outside the store informing passers-by that only small amounts of cash are kept on-site;
- money is not be stored on the premises unless essential. Hence wages are paid through bank transfers and not in cash;
- very little cash is kept in the cash register at night—for example, $5 in coins, $20 in small notes;
- time access safes are used for depositing larger money denominations such as $50 notes;
- after dark, unused cash registers are left empty and open with drawers tilted up for full view;
- cash is only counted in a secured room out of sight of other staff and passers by;
- operating hours are regularly reviewed to assess any correlation with robbery and violent incidents;
- money is transferred to banks at regular intervals, but at irregular times and by different routes. Banks are forewarned of expected time of arrival so the alarm can be raised quickly if staff do not arrive on time or are held up during the journey;
- staff transferring money do not do so alone, during deposit one staff member looks the other way to keep an eye on surroundings;
- staff transferring money carry a personal alarm and a mobile phone;
- as few people as possible are aware when money transfers will take place;
- if using a private car for transporting money, the doors are left locked, the vehicle is not left en-route, quiet streets are avoided, and routes and times are varied;
- the carrying of money is not advertised, for example, bank bags are not used;
- time of expected return is noted by another staff member so alerts can be quickly raised; and
- if taxis are used for cash transfers, they are booked and the number of the assigned cab is retained.

(c) Organisational staffing strategies can include:

- evening and night staff and those who work alone are provided with additional security, for example duress alarms and regular check-ins;
- any staff members rostered for evening or night work, or to work alone, are experienced workers;
- additional security procedures are implemented for staff working with high-risk customers or in high crime areas;
- there are detailed security provisions for staff who work off-site. For example, orders for home-delivered goods require checks if customer has previously ordered goods, the provision of mobile phones to staff, standardised phone-in check times, and recording of customer address details prior to delivery;

- other evening and night workers are encouraged to visit premises out-of-hours when possible, for example free coffee is provided to taxi drivers in cafés;
- staff are well trained and re-trained in appropriate responses to armed hold-ups and robberies;
- access of customers with a history of violence is restricted if possible, but if offenders frequent the area or site, additional security measures will be adopted. For example, security guards will be hired;
- a register is kept of "risky" customers;
- all staff are required to report suspicious, violent or unusual behaviour to security;
- particular care is taken by the first person arriving on-site in the morning and the last staff member to leave First entry staff look for suspicious persons loitering, and signs of attempted entry. Last person to leave phones contact person before leaving and after safe arrival at destination;
- Before exiting, staff member looks for loitering persons and if suspicions are aroused activates assistance systems or phones police; and
- patrol schedules and security techniques are revised regularly.

(d) Emergency and crisis response plan can include:

- on every phone is a sticker that states "in the event of an emergency, contact reception or security on (INSERT NUMBER)";
- an emergency alarm button is installed at reception, near the cash register(s) and in all customer service rooms;
- electronic as well as manual alarm systems are in place;
- devices are installed that allow the point of sale operator to remotely close entrance door (denies suspicious person access);
- an emergency and crisis response plan is in place, and is regularly reviewed by the OHS and security committee;
- the emergency and crisis team members have been trained in early threat recognition, and have liaised with relevant outside authorities including the police;
- all personnel are aware of, and have been trained in, emergency and crisis responses;
- there is a floor and unit emergency warden system in place that is checked regularly;
- escape routes have been planned and are practiced; and
- the emergency and crisis response plan includes: post-incident control of the immediate working environment; control of offenders who may have collapsed or been apprehended; provision of information to law enforcement agencies; guidelines for provision of media statements; post-incident investigation and analysis; and confidential debriefing of staff.

form last updated: ....

(Developed from USOPM 1998, p. 22; CAL/OSHA 1998, pp. 6, 9, 11; WorkCover South Australia 1998a, pp. 14–16, 1998b, p. 2, and 1998c; DWH&S 1997, pp. 5–10; Heskett 1996, p. 112; Kinney 1996, p. 309; Long Island Coalition 1996, p. 60; Wynne et al. 1996, pp. 30–32; CAL/OSHA 1995, p. 10; WCBBC 1995, p. 19; WorkCover New South Wales 1994; Cardy 1992, pp. 38, 107, 113–115.)

Appendix 8

> **Possible Guidelines to Prevent Robbery-Related Violence When Delivering Services Off-Site**
>
> - the situations when robbery-related violence is more common have been identified and patterns are monitored;
> - staff are aware of the limits of their physical mobility and strength;
> - records are kept of names, contact numbers and home addresses of off-site staff;
> - detailed timetables are kept of where staff are, whom they are with, how long they should be, and when they are expected back;
> - if a stranger rings for a delivery, it is routine to call back to check details of address, and so on;
> - customers are assessed for violence potential before staff deliver a service off-site;
> - diaries or computerised records are kept on-site of past violence-prone customers from previous off-site deliveries of services;
> - procedures are in place *and followed* if staff cannot be contacted or do not return or check in when expected;
> - procedures are in place for off-site and delivery staff who feel at risk, change plans, or are delayed;
> - before any off-site visit a code word, phrase or sentence is agreed that can be incorporated in a telephone conversation to indicate danger;
> - off-site and delivery customers are visited in daylight only if possible;
> - off-site and delivery staff are issued with personal alarms, mobile phones and public phone change or card;
> - vehicles used for off-site or delivery visits have sufficient fuel, with spare in case staff are lost;
> - when staff arrive at a destination, parking location is assessed for nearest exit route;
> - staff always park cars in well-lit areas;
> - lock-up procedures are followed for cars, car keys and alarms;
> - staff carry a mobile phone with a charged battery with them to the customer's door;
> - when staff knock on the door, they stand to one side and not in a position where the opening of a screen door can trap them;
> - staff avoid going into a house or dwelling unless it is absolutely essential;
> - if staff feel at risk or receive an aggressive reception—they leave immediately—or make a very big fuss if they cannot;
> - if necessary, staff wait to be asked inside, and let the customer lead the way;
> - inside the house, staff try to ensure they have a clear exit line;
> - staff try to avoid reacting to house smell, surroundings or untidiness;
> - at all times staff remain alert to sudden changes in customer mood;

- on leaving the customer, staff approach car with keys in hand;

- the back seat of the car is checked before staff climb into the driving seat;

- if there are people hanging around the car as staff approach, they do not go and ask them what they are doing as this will identify staff as the driver-owner. Staff are instructed to cross over, walk away and call the police;

- if transporting a customer (such as estate agent and client), the lighter and mirror on the passenger side are removed as these may be used as weapons, the glove box is locked, and staff drive in the left hand lane in case they have to stop quickly and get out;

- staff are instructed to do whatever is necessary to protect themselves, and not to worry about failure of completing their work task;

- procedures for staff delivering goods to other people's homes are fully understood and well practised;

- routes to and from work are varied (particularly if valuables or drugs are carried);

- a work car is used for off-site visits if possible; and

- if staff believe that they are at special risk, additional security measures are adopted.

(Cherry and Upston 1997, pp. 6–10; WCBBC 1995, pp. 13–14; Cardy 1992, pp. 38, 111–112.)

Appendix 9

Possible Guidelines for Staff During an Armed Hold-Up or Robbery

Workers are instructed to:

- cooperate with robbers and give them what they want;
- listen attentively to robbers, and be courteous and patient;
- speak to robbers in as calm a manner as possible;
- treat the robber as if she or he was a customer;
- do not resist as this is the most reliable way to avoid injury;
- do not become physically involved with a shoplifter or robber;
- do not make any sudden moves;
- warn robbers about possible surprises such as another employee in a store room who is expected to return;
- do not do anything that could exacerbate a tense nervous situation;
- if other employees are in another part of the building, try and signal them only if there is no chance that the robbers can see you;
- activate duress alarm only if it can be done safely, usually after robbers leave the store;
- do not risk harm to yourself or others. That is, do not be a hero;
- NEVER try to grab a weapon;
- do not pursue robbers after they leave the store, but note direction they left in;
- after a robbery, close and lock the store and do not re-open until police arrive;
- do not touch anything robbers handled; and
- staff write down everything they can remember about the robbery while they wait for police to arrive, especially identifying features of robbers. Features of assailants recorded include: height and weight; eye, hair and skin colour; presence of tattoos or distinguishing marks; clothing—including shoes (offenders may dispose of clothing but retain shoes).

(Schneid 1998, p. 34; Bellamy 1996, p. 47; Heskett 1996, p. 143; CAL/OSHA 1995, pp. 16–17; Indermaur 1995, p. 187; WCBBC 1995, pp. 15–18.)

Appendix 10

Possible Strategies that May Assist with Hostage Survival

(These may be particularly relevant to establishments where there are significant amounts of cash)

- if anticipated robbery rewards are not available, or a person targeted for violence is absent, sometimes staff can be taken hostage in lieu;

- the overall aim is to survive the hostage episode. The actions or words to achieve this may be against your nature or distasteful at times;

- do not argue with hostage taker over any issue, particularly over his or her reasons or behaviour;

- try to establish a rapport with the hostage taker and try to relate to the plight of the hostage taker (if you are valued the chances of harm are lower);

- the more positive the emotional rapport the better. Do not appear to be unemotional or uninvolved;

- encourage him or her to talk with you and be a sympathetic and sincere listener;

- engage in conversation with the hostage taker as much as possible and talk about personal hopes, family and other matters that build on your identity as a "real" person. Ask his or her advice if possible;

- focus on the future in conversations and your (modest) hopes with your family;

- gently encourage the hostage taker to refer to you by your nickname;

- do not try to reason with him or her, to defend the organisation or even yourself. He or she will be resentful of your authority, how you used it, and your insensitivity to his or her interests;

- do not grovel, but be remorseful, empathetic and respectful. Do not tell him or her you know how he or she feels because he or she knows that you cannot;

- do not be condescending in any way;

- do not be self-righteous in any way;

- do not give the impression that you think he or she will fail or that you expect the situation to come out alright;

- permit him or her to view himself or herself as the master of your fate;

- do not watch him or her all of the time. Make it appear you submit to his or her control and mercy;

- side with the hostage taker in all matters and join with him or her against the authorities, but do not oversell it;

- carefully test the permitted range of movement while engendering trust; and

- recognise that the authorities may need your assistance at some stage to help you.

(Capozzoli and McVey 1996, pp. 117–19.)

Appendix 11

Possible Armed Hold-Ups and Robbery-Related Violence Prevention Training Course Components

In this organisation:

- all workers have induction training that includes armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention; and

- regular re-training is provided to "at-risk" staff.

Aim: To ensure employees can define the range of armed hold-up and robbery-related violent behaviours, are aware of the prevention policy and strategies, can recognise warning signs of impending violence, understand the audit process, and are aware of legal responsibilities.

Objectives: At the end of the program employees will be able to explain their duties, identify warning signs, understand the impact of violence on victims, complete an incident report, conduct a violence audit/risk assessment, complete checklists, and recommend preventive actions.

Training components include:

- a definition of armed hold-up and robbery-related violence;

- an explanation of the prevention policy in place;

- detailed explanation of the strategies in place, including cash handling procedures;

- CEO commitment and responsibilities;

- employee responsibilities;

- OHS and security legal requirements;

- the name of the armed hold-up and robbery-related violence contact officer;

- typical armed hold-up and robbery-related violent behaviours—and their impacts;

- how to operate cash control equipment such as drop safes;

- off-site delivery of goods and robbery-related violence prevention strategies;

- warning signs of impending violence, including body language;

- mechanisms to report an armed hold-up and robbery-related violent incident;

- the aim of regular audits/risk assessments;

- the process of risk identification, risk assessment and risk control;

- risk factors specific to this organisation or work tasks;

- emergency response plans; and

- post-incident supports.

(USOPM 1998, pp. 19–22; Cardy 1992.)

Date course last updated:.............................

Appendix 12

Resource Needs for an Armed Hold-Up and Robbery-Related Violence Prevention Training Program

Time required: 1.5 hours.

Target groups: all employees.

Resources:

- whiteboard;
- pens and paper;
- handouts on organisation armed hold-up and robbery-related violence prevention policy, strategies and checklists;
- handouts on typical behaviours and risk factors;
- handouts on security guidelines, on-site procedures for cash handling, and off-site delivery guidelines;
- photocopies of recent legal case outcomes; and
- overview of OHS and security legislative framework for specific state.

Environment: large room with breakout space for small group role plays and discussions

Timetable:

introduction	(10 minutes)
definition of armed hold-up and robbery-related violence	(5 minutes)
employer and CEO duty of care	(10 minutes)
prevention policy	(5 minutes)
prevention strategies	(15 minutes)
cash handling procedures	(10 minutes)
other security controls	(10 minutes)
off-site delivery robbery-related violence prevention strategies	(5 minutes)
violence audit/risk assessment checklists	(10 minutes)
break-out role plays	(10 minutes)

(adapted from Cardy 1992, p. 168.)

Appendix 13

Possible Security Audit Checklist

On (*insert date*) a security audit was carried out.

The security audit was conducted by: ....

Employer representative: ....

Employee representative: ....

OHS committee representative:..

Security staff representative: ....

(a) Does the security control plan include:

mission statement	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
policy statement	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
violence incident report form	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
violence audit checklist	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
emergency and crisis plan	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
off-site delivery to customer	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
floor plans displayed with emergency exits, equipment	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate

(b) Methods of control:

reception and access control	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
cash control procedures	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
cash transportation procedures	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
reporting procedures	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
training program	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
computer, records security	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
stock control procedures	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
after hours security	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
off-site delivery	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate

(c) Reviews undertaken by OHS and security committee:

past incidents by type	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
past incidents by area	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
past incidents by gender	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
past incidents by task	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate
anonymous survey of staff	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ yes, but inadequate

(d) Risk assessment:

is money exchanged	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
is business open at night	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
is business in high-crime area	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
is business isolated	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable

robberies in last 3 years	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
violence in last 3 years	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable

(e) Engineering controls:

access to outside phone line	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
emergency nos. on phone	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
easily seen from street	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
bright lighting outside	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
all indoor lights working	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
windows have clear view	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
cash register in clear view	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
time-access or drop safe	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
security cameras and mirrors	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
height markers on exit doors	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
bullet-resistant enclosures	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
sprinklers and smoke alarms	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
fire fighting equipment	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
Australian Standards that apply such as lighting	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate

(f) Administrative controls:

emergency procedures	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
employees trained	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
emergency response training	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
conflict resolution training	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
cash control procedures	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
late night cash procedures	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
cash limit on-site	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
signs: no cash, drugs on-site	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
no working alone	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable
open and close procedures	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
controls over contractors	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ not applicable

(g) policy and strategy evaluation:

tracking of incidents	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
anonymous survey of staff	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
risk controls evaluated	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
data provided to staff	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
open and close procedures	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
data included in staff reviews	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate
in-depth violence audits	☐ yes	☐ no	☐ inadequate

Plan last audited on: ....(date)   Plan last updated on: ....

(OSHA 1998, pp. 11–12; USOPM 1998, p. 22; Long Island Coalition 1996, pp. 60–64.)